The free and open Indo-Pacific strategy and uncertainties for India & Japan by Palit, Amitendu & Sano, Shutaro
Drs Amitendu Palit
and Shutaro Sano, 
Research Fellow at the
Institute of South Asian
Studies, and Professor
at the National Defense
Academy of Japan,
respectively, explain
that “From the
perspectives of both
India and Japan, the
Free and Open Indo-
Pacific should remain a
development-focused
initiative.”  
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and
Uncertainties for India & Japan 
By Amitendu Palit and
Shutaro Sano
The Trump administration has signaled its intention to engage closely with the Indo-Pacific by
committing to new strategic investment initiatives and economic cooperation with Japan, India, Australia,
and Mongolia. The concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) is not new and was
originally coined and reflected in Japan's forein policy strategy under the Abe administration. However,
India and Japan continue to face some uncertainties over the nature of their engagement with the United
States' vision of the FOIP. These uncertainties arise from lack of clarity over whether the FOIP would
focus more on economic development or aim to develop into a security-oriented strategy for countering
China; the FOIP’s relation with the other prominent connectivity initiative in the region – China’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI); and whether the Trump Administration’s foreign and trade policy emphasis on
‘America First’ would prevent the Indo-Pacific region from acquiring an inclusive character.   
 
For both India and Japan, it is important to assess the possibility of the FOIP encouraging strategic
reorganization of the region for fostering a stronger security relationship among the so-called “Quad” of
like-minded states (i.e. United States, Japan, India, and Australia) looking to contain China. The imperative
arises from the prominence and progress of the BRI, whose cross-continental geography — including
mega cross-border infrastructure projects — makes it capable of creating a global economic center of
gravity in the Indo-Pacific. But BRI’s geopolitics can be destabilizing for the region.  
 
Notwithstanding downsides surrounding BRI such as high debt to China and alleged corruption in deals,
many countries are unwilling to be perceived as taking sides between Beijing and Washington. Both
participant and non-participant countries are wary of security initiatives in the region like the revival of
the Australia-India-Japan-US Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue. Also, expansion of membership of a
grouping like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) indicates a need to take evolving security
conditions into account with respect to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the BRI. Furthermore, the Trump
administration has explicitly condemned China along with Russia as “revisionist powers,” and has recently
sanctioned Beijing for its purchase of Russian-made Su-35S fighters and S-400 surface-to-air missile
systems. But while the United States might have distinct incentives in making the FOIP a more security-
oriented strategy including a hardline approach toward China, there are risks in doing so and competing
with the BRI. Emphasizing a security-oriented framework and urging partners like India and Japan into
more muscular posturing against China would force Beijing to further securitize BRI through efforts like
militarizing commercial ports. From the perspectives of both India and Japan, the FOIP should remain a
development-focused initiative and should also provide a vision for complementing ongoing connectivity
projects like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic
Corridor (BCIM), the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the Russia-led Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU). 
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The commercial salience of the FOIP for the United States is evident from President Trump’s
articulation of the notion - both in November 2017 and July 2018 – at major business forums both US-
based and regional. Apart from committing strategic investments worth US$113.5 million in
infrastructure development, energy security, and digital connectivity, the United States is looking to
work closely with Japan, India, Australia, and Mongolia in infrastructure development under the FOIP.
But going by the experience of the BRI, top-down investment commitments are not sufficient for
ensuring the credibility of the initiative. More and more countries are criticizing the BRI’s purported
motive of building a China-led global order by impairing strategic autonomy of investment-recipient
countries and forcing some of them into debt traps. FOIP needs to avoid the legitimacy problems of the
BRI. While doing so, it must also fashion ways of co-existing with the BRI. 
 
India and Japan would also expect from the FOIP an economic vision for the Indo-Pacific region that is
much broader than an agenda of disparate infrastructure engagement with a few countries. A free and
open Indo-Pacific should aim for a ‘free and open’ economic geography by articulating an economic
architecture. Without such a vision, there is the possibility of strategic investments by the United States
being viewed largely as efforts to enhance greater access of American goods and services in the Indo-
Pacific markets. 
 
New Delhi and Tokyo have been working with Washington to promote regional infrastructure
development through initiatives like the Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group set up in 2015 to
identify possible collaborative efforts that can help strengthen regional connectivity. Bilaterally, India
and Japan have launched the India-Japan Act East Forum and Tokyo and Washington have initiated the
Strategic Energy Partnership. The four Quad countries - Australia, India, Japan, and the United States –
are discussing a joint regional infrastructure project. The FOIP cannot grow in exclusion of these
projects; that would leave New Delhi and Tokyo searching for rationale to stay committed to the FOIP.  
 
FOIP’s characterization as an anti-China project with limited economic vision and inclusivity will create
challenges for India and Japan in remaining committed to the US efforts. Both countries are conscious
about the importance of not committing themselves to any initiative that is construed as a distinct anti-
China posturing. India has been particularly cautious in this regard, and has stayed away from the latest
US-Japan-Australia infrastructure partnership and has not agreed to elevate the Quad talks to Secretary-
level consultations. Specific bilateral issues such as US dissatisfaction over the trade imbalance with
Japan and India, and the rising rejection of Indian H-1B applicants by the United States, might also affect
India and Japan’s involvement in the US-led aspects of FOIP. The different geopolitical approaches of
the two countries to the region, such as Japan’s enduring reliance on its alliance with the United States,
and India’s emphasis on the FOIP’s inclusive character, will also be important determinants, as would
the two countries’ respective strategies towards China’s BRI. Notwithstanding hesitations, India and
Japan should actively consider contributing to FOIP as it provides the opportunity of enhancing both
geopolitical and geo-economic cooperation through a regional connectivity agenda. 
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